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Indianapolis Star

April 29, 2005

Town Sighs With Relief As VX Destruction Set

Toxic substance will be neutralized at Newport depot starting next month.

By Tammy Webber

NEWPORT, Ind. -- Tom Burch has been nervous for almost 40 years, knowing that the deadliest substance in the world was just four miles west of his home.

In fact, Burch, 70, helped make the VX nerve agent that the U.S. Army will begin destroying in about two weeks at the Newport Chemical Depot.

Officials said Thursday that VX neutralization will begin May 5 to 15, but they would not release the exact date for security reasons.

"I'll be tickled to death when it's gone; I'll sure sleep better," said Burch, who worked in a laboratory testing VX in the 1960s.

"But it looks like they're taking every step they can (to be safe), and that pleases me to no end."

He was one of dozens of residents from the surrounding area who attended a public information session here Thursday.

Officials from the Army and Parsons, the contractor hired to destroy the agent, were on hand to answer questions. About 1,600 tons of VX -- enough to kill more than 1 billion people -- have been stored at the depot since 1969. It is the only place the agent was made.

VX -- developed as a weapon to deter the Soviet Union but never used -- is so deadly that a single pin drop can kill a person in minutes. But officials say there are so many precautions in place that an accident during destruction is almost impossible.

The agent will be destroyed in airtight buildings by mixing it with hot sodium hydroxide and water. The byproduct, a caustic chemical called hydrolysate, will stay in Newport until the Army decides where it will be disposed.

The Army wants to ship the chemical to a DuPont Co. plant in New Jersey for final treatment and release it into the Delaware River. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention released a study that said neutralizing and transporting the byproduct was safe, but the study also raised concerns about whether it could be treated adequately for release into the river.

Jeffrey L. Brubaker, the Army's project manager in Newport, said DuPont has submitted proof to the CDC that it can make the byproduct safe for release.

"I remain very confident that we will be able to resolve the issues from the report," he said.

Richard Rife, project manager for Parsons, said last-minute preoperative checks have been performed.

"We are confident we will start in the 10-day window; frankly, it's looking good. I'm really rarin' to go," he said.

"I think it's significant that this country prides itself in complying with treaties it signs. We have an obligation to get rid of this stuff, and we will soon get rid of it here, which I suppose makes a lot of local citizens happy," Rife said.

Officials said they have beefed up security at the depot but would not give specifics.

Brubaker said a final "walkdown," looking at the entire system, will be done today with senior managers from the Army and Parsons.

"It's an exciting time for the work force. They will be relieved when they process the first ton container," Brubaker said.

"And it's an exciting time for the public and the community. They have waited a long time. . . . I have sensed the anticipation."

He said residents should not even notice when the agent destruction begins. Startup will be slow for the first six months; initially, a container or two will be destroyed each day.

Many Newport-area residents say they're not worried at all but will be glad when this chapter in the town's history is over.

Juanita Julick, 80, listened intently as a depot worker explained how a rubber suit and air tank would protect workers from VX exposure, exclaiming, "Isn't that something?"

"We just take it in stride," she said.

Added Harold Ratliff, 65, Cayuga: "I'm too old to worry about it."

<http://www.indystar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050429/NEWS01/504290499&SearchID=73206855316443>

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Los Angeles Times

April 30, 2005

U.S. Downplays Remarks On N. Korea's Arms Ability

Officials say the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency may have overstated Pyongyang's nuclear missile progress.

By Greg Miller and Mark Mazzetti, Times Staff Writers

WASHINGTON — Although intelligence analysts are increasingly concerned that North Korea may be able to arm a missile with a nuclear warhead, U.S. spy agencies have not obtained evidence confirming that Pyongyang has developed that capability, intelligence officials and weapons proliferation experts said Friday.

The officials said assessments of North Korea's ability to devise a functional nuclear warhead are based largely on projections of its presumed progress toward that goal, not on any significant intelligence discoveries.

For that reason, several officials said, a senior Pentagon intelligence official might have overstated the position of analysts when he told a Senate committee Thursday that the U.S. believed North Korea had the ability to arm a missile with a nuclear device.

The assertion by Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, appeared to mark the first time a senior government official had declared North Korea capable of making a nuclear warhead.

Pentagon officials sought to lessen the impact of Jacoby's remarks. Pentagon spokesman Lawrence Di Rita stressed that there had been "no new assessment" on the North Korean nuclear threat. He also said the United States could not be sure that North Korea had the ability to arm a ballistic missile and hit U.S. targets.

"I don't believe we know that," Di Rita said at a news conference, stressing that Jacoby was largely describing theoretical capabilities. Di Rita declined to say whether Jacoby had misspoken.

"His words were what his words were," Di Rita said.

In a follow-up statement Friday evening, Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said, "North Korea has a theoretical capability to produce a warhead and mate it with a missile, but we have no information to suggest they have done so."

Jacoby's comments alarmed lawmakers and suggested a significant escalation of the North Korean nuclear threat. His remarks also came at a time when joint diplomatic efforts by China, the United States, Russia, Japan and South Korea to persuade the North to dismantle its nuclear weapons program have stalled.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill sounded a gloomy note on the impasse at a news conference Friday in Seoul.

"The mood as we discuss the progress of these talks is not very good," he said.

Hill, who has been shuttling among Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo, said he planned to go to Moscow soon.

North Korea has not responded to President Bush's characterization Thursday of Kim Jong Il as a "tyrant" and a "dangerous person."

Hill urged Pyongyang, the communist nation's capital, not to overreact. Bush has "made it very clear we are looking for a diplomatic solution," he said.

Some government officials in Washington said Jacoby was too categorical when he told the Senate Armed Services Committee that U.S. intelligence had assessed that North Korea was capable of putting a nuclear payload on a missile.

"He went beyond what the intelligence community consensus is," said a government official with access to U.S. assessments on North Korea.

The ability to arm a missile with a nuclear payload "is something you have to worry about and assume they're working on," the official said. "But that's not something you see from overhead imagery. You need other kinds of intelligence to make the determination they've actually accomplished that engineering feat."

Several officials acknowledged that the United States lacked such intelligence.

A U.S. intelligence official indicated that there was no consensus on North Korea's capabilities, saying there are "differing views on where they are" in developing nuclear warhead technology.

Pyongyang declared in February that it had nuclear weapons.

But the ability to "marry" a nuclear device with a ballistic missile requires significant technological expertise, including "miniaturizing" the device to fit inside a missile tip.

Those technical hurdles are so high that some intelligence officials believe that Pakistan, a country with a demonstrated nuclear arsenal, would have to rely on airplanes rather than missiles to deliver a nuclear strike.

Some experts said Jacoby's remarks reflected long-held suspicions about North Korea's nuclear warhead capabilities.

"I think that's been the assumption for quite some time," said Robert J. Einhorn, a former assistant secretary of State for nonproliferation who is an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "My guess is this is based on what we know about their missile program, the test we saw seven years ago, and a lot of extrapolation."

Einhorn was referring to North Korea's 1998 test of a three-stage missile in which the third stage exploded.

Other experts expressed skepticism that Pyongyang was as far along as Jacoby suggested.

"I think he misspoke," said Joseph Cirincione, a nuclear proliferation expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

"North Korea does not have a missile that can reach the United States. There is no compelling evidence that they have a nuclear warhead that can be put on any missile."

Times staff writers John Hendren in Washington and Barbara Demick in Seoul contributed to this report.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-norkor30apr30,1,6321646.story>

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New York Times
April 30, 2005

Iranians Seek Nuclear Deal In Meeting With Europeans In London

By Alan Cowell

LONDON, April 29 - Iranian and European negotiators met in secrecy here on Friday to seek agreement over Iran's nuclear program, and Iranian leaders increased pressure for a quick deal to permit them to resume enriching uranium for nuclear fuel.

Despite the tough talk from figures in Tehran, including former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, officials from both sides said the talks on Friday night were unlikely to reach any kind of breakthrough.

The United States and Europe have pushed Iran to renounce all uranium enrichment as a guarantee against a clandestine program to make weapons-grade uranium. Under international pressure, Iran has suspended its uranium enrichment program and has been negotiating with Britain, France and Germany over the future of the program. Iran has insisted that its nuclear program is exclusively for electric power generation.

The United States has warned that if Iran ends the talks and resumes enrichment, Washington will seek action from the United Nations Security Council, possibly leading to economic sanctions.

The Europeans have taken a less confrontational tack, seeking to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program in return for economic concessions.

On the Iranian side, however, the issue has been wrapped up in the country's looming presidential elections on June 17, and European diplomats say they fear that recent Iranian statements may reflect political posturing.

Iran is seeking European assent to a small experimental enrichment program, but both the Europeans and the United States oppose the idea. In Tehran on Friday, Mr. Rafsanjani said Iran was "determined to have all branches of nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment, and we will have it at any cost," Reuters reported.

Mr. Rafsanjani's words echoed remarks on Thursday by Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, who said, "If talks with European Union are not successful tomorrow, negotiations will collapse, and we will have no choice but to restart the uranium enrichment program."

But the senior officials from both sides who are conducting the talks seemed anxious to play down any high expectations from the London encounter.

The head of the Iranian negotiators, Muhammad Javad Zarif, citing remarks by other Iranian officials, said: "We engage in these talks in order to make a deal, and not to break one. We are hoping for tangible progress on reaching an agreement."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/30/international/europe/30iran.html>

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New York Times
May 1, 2005
Pg. 1

Threats Shadow New Conference On Nuclear Arms

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, April 30 - Just 48 hours before representatives of 189 nations meet at the United Nations to review the flaws in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Iran threatened Saturday to resume producing nuclear fuel, and North Korea dismissed President Bush as a "philistine whom we can never deal with."

The conference that begins Monday was meant to offer hope of closing huge loopholes in the treaty, which the United States says Iran and North Korea have exploited to pursue nuclear weapons. Instead, the session appears deadlocked even before it begins, according to senior American officials and diplomats preparing for it in New York.

Already virtually dead, the officials say, is a proposal by Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, that would impose a five-year moratorium on all new enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of plutonium. Those activities are the two main paths to a nuclear weapon. But the United States, Japan and France oppose the moratorium because of its potential disruption of nuclear power projects. In this case, Iran is in the same camp.

Iran, a signatory to the treaty, declared Saturday that negotiations with the European Union over the future of its nuclear program had made so little progress by Friday evening that it might end its voluntary halt on enriching uranium next week. Hassan Rowhani, the top Iranian negotiator, said that next week the country's leadership would make "a definitive decision on whether or not to resume uranium enrichment."

As they prepare for an election in June, Iran's leaders have argued that the country will never give up the right - provided under the treaty - to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. But Mr. Bush has cited Iran as an example of a country that is using the treaty to fuel a covert weapons program, and the president's aides will argue in New York that, properly interpreted, the treaty should bar Iran from any nuclear work because it hid so many of its activities from inspectors for 18 years.

"The Iran situation has turned very serious in the past few days," a senior European diplomat said Saturday. "We think they are about to start up again," the diplomat said, though they may begin by resuming manufacture of a raw form of uranium that, until enriched, cannot be used for weapons.

North Korea's declaration on Saturday that it would not deal with Mr. Bush was its first response to Mr. Bush's statements on the Korean nuclear crisis at his news conference on Thursday evening. Mr. Bush called Kim Jong Il, North Korea's leader, a "tyrant" and said he maintained "concentration camps." But he insisted that the United States would continue negotiations over the North's nuclear program. While it is difficult to sort through North Korea's often overheated official rhetoric, until now its position has been that it wants to negotiate with the administration one-on-one.

American intelligence officials said Friday that they were increasingly concerned about murky evidence that North Korea may be preparing for a test that would end debate about whether it has mastered the technology of building nuclear warheads. The country pulled out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty two years ago and ejected international inspectors. That showcased another flaw in the treaty: it permits countries to build nuclear programs for peaceful purposes and then, with 90 days notice, pull out of the treaty. That means they can develop facilities under the treaty, then shift them to weapons programs.

After North Korea's withdrawal, Mr. Bush has led the international criticism of the treaty, contending in a February 2004 speech that Iran and North Korea - both of which obtained nuclear technology from the illicit network built by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear engineer - are vivid examples of how the treaty has all but collapsed.

A conference to review progress in compliance with the treaty is held every five years. In addition to the moratorium, there is another proposal to close one of the loopholes. Germany and France have suggested that countries that built nuclear facilities under the protection of the treaty would have to dismantle them if they withdraw.

But in the year that has followed, Mr. Bush and his aides decided not to call for the treaty to be rewritten. They fear doing so would take the focus away from Iran and North Korea, and play into the hands of nations that complain the existing treaty favors nations that already have large nuclear arsenals, and that have moved too slowly to fill their commitments to shrinking those arsenals to zero. Mr. Bush is sending only midlevel officials to the opening of the conference in New York.

"I'm gratified by the fact that there seems to be a consensus that we have a problem," said Stephen G. Rademaker, the State Department official who will be leading the American delegation. "There is a problem with the nuclear fuel cycle, and the capability that it can give to those who have nuclear weapons, or who want them."

Mr. Rademaker finds himself in the uncomfortable position of agreeing with Iran on one point: that a moratorium on new nuclear activity must be avoided. Iran has objected to the proposal because it would kill its ambitious nuclear plans. But major industrialized countries - including the United States, Japan and France - have also objected.

Mr. Rademaker, in an interview, brushed aside comparisons between the American position and Iran's. "The larger point in this is that nobody who is a key country in this debate has endorsed the ElBaradei proposal for a moratorium," he said.

Mr. Bush, whose aversion to large United Nations forums is well known, has chosen a different way to address the loopholes in the treaty: he is seeking agreement from a smaller club, called the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to cut off the sale of all nuclear equipment to countries like Iran and North Korea. No such agreement has been reached within that group, which is made up of technologically advanced nations, and which meets largely in secret. Mr. Bush has also organized a group of nations into a partnership called the Proliferation Security Initiative to seize nuclear-related shipments.

That approach is intended to work around the United Nations, and avoid subjecting the United States to a broad debate about whether it is in compliance with its own obligations under the treaty. Nonnuclear countries agree to forgo acquiring weapons under the treaty, while the United States and other nuclear powers agree to the eventual elimination of their own stockpiles. But no timetable is set. (Israel, India and Pakistan never signed the treaty and, like North Korea, will not be officially represented at the conference.)

"The administration wants to use the meeting to point to Iran and North Korea, and much of the rest of the world wants to use it to say that the Bush administration has flagrantly flouted its own responsibilities," said Graham Allison, a nuclear expert at Harvard who has written extensively on the spread of nuclear weapons.

A colleague of Professor Allison's at Harvard, Matthew Bunn, puts Mr. Bush's situation a bit differently: "You only get constraints on the rest of the world if you accept more constraints on us."

He noted that the last treaty review conference, in 2000, ended with a political declaration of "13 steps" toward disarmament that the Clinton administration also endorsed. They included maintenance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty - which the Bush administration jettisoned - and ratification of a comprehensive test ban treaty, which Mr. Bush has also opposed.

"We now have replaced the ABM treaty with the Treaty of Moscow," Mr. Rademaker noted, referring to a treaty with Russia. "That commits all sides to a two-thirds reduction in our nuclear arsenals. That is a stabilizing treaty," he said.

Mr. Rademaker said his goal for the conference was to "come up with ways of reinforcing the regime without rewriting the regime." But because the conference operates by consensus, the Bush administration's expectations are minimal.

The conference lasts until May 27, meaning that the Iran and North Korea dramas will play out while the session goes on.

The leading candidate for the presidency of Iran, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, said Friday during prayer sermons at Tehran University that Iran would pursue the enrichment of uranium "at all costs."

Iran, he said, "considers itself strong enough to defend its rights." Referring to the Europeans, he said the country would not let other nations impose any permanent suspension of uranium enrichment.

"We will be patient and will continue these lengthy and fruitless negotiations until you are persuaded that we are not seeking nuclear weapons," he said.

Alan Cowell contributed reporting from London for this article, and Nazila Fathi from Tehran.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/01/international/middleeast/01nuke.html>

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Los Angeles Times

May 1, 2005

Iran Likely To Restart Enrichment

By Associated Press

TEHRAN — Iran said Saturday that it was likely to resume activities related to uranium enrichment within a week, a process it had halted last year to build confidence in talks with European countries and avoid referral to the United Nations Security Council for possible sanctions.

Tehran's announcement came a day after talks in London with European negotiators yielded no results. France, Britain and Germany, acting on behalf of the 25-nation European Union, are seeking guarantees from Iran that it will not use its nuclear program to make weapons, as Washington suspects.

Top Iranian nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani said Tehran expected to restart enrichment activities at a facility in Isfahan.

"It's unlikely that uranium enrichment ... which takes place in Natanz, will be resumed, but it's likely that some activities at Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility will restart next week," Rowhani said, according to the Islamic Republic News Agency.

Natanz and Isfahan house the heart of Iran's nuclear program. The Isfahan conversion facility reprocesses uranium ore concentrate into gas, which is then taken to Natanz to be enriched. The Europeans want Iran to permanently abandon enrichment, a process that can produce nuclear reactor fuel and, at a higher level, material for bombs.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iran1may01.1.7300127.story>

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Los Angeles Times

May 1, 2005

N. Korea Lashes Out At 'Hooligan' Bush

The communist regime says it won't negotiate with the president, who called Kim a tyrant.

By Barbara Demick, Times Staff Writer

SEOUL — North Korea appeared to slam the door on a diplomatic solution to its nuclear impasse with the Bush administration in a sharply worded denunciation Saturday, calling the president a "philistine" and a "hooligan" with whom it could not negotiate.

Colorful invective from Pyongyang is nothing new, but the latest war of words might have more serious implications, coming at a sensitive time.

U.S. officials warned allies Saturday that satellite imagery suggested an upcoming North Korean nuclear test, possibly as early as June, Associated Press reported. The news agency cited unnamed diplomats in Vienna, headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Last month, North Korea shut down a nuclear reactor in Yongbyon in what experts believe was a preparatory step to extracting weapons-grade plutonium.

The regime announced Feb. 10 that it had nuclear weapons, but it is not recognized as a nuclear power because it has not conducted a test explosion.

The crisis has worsened in recent weeks, with Pyongyang accelerating the pace of its nuclear program and refusing to resume multinational talks aimed at getting it to end its weapons efforts.

In its statement Saturday, attributed to an unnamed Foreign Ministry spokesman, North Korea said in its strongest language yet that it did not intend to negotiate with the Bush administration. Previous denunciations of U.S. policy have always left open the possibility of talks.

"Bush is a hooligan bereft of any personality as a human being, to say nothing of stature as president of a country. He is a half-baked man in terms of morality and a philistine whom we can never deal with," the official KCNA news service reported him as saying.

North Korea "does not expect any solution to the nuclear issue or any progress in the DPRK-US relations during his term," the spokesman said.

He was responding to comments Bush had made Thursday at a news conference in Washington, labeling North Korean leader Kim Jong Il a "tyrant" and a "dangerous person." The Pyongyang regime is intolerant of criticism of the Kim family.

Christopher Hill, an assistant secretary of State who has been shuttling among Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo trying to restart the talks, tried to downplay Bush's remarks Friday, saying, "I think the North Korean government would be wise to focus ... on what they need in this negotiation rather than be concerned about descriptions of them."

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-norkor1may01,1,4685660.story>

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Washington Post

May 2, 2005

Pg. 1

Iran Plans Defense Of Nuclear Program

U.S. Is Set to Deliver Ultimatum at Meeting

By Dafna Linzer, Washington Post Staff Writer

Iran is planning to mount a staunch defense of its nuclear energy program at an international conference beginning today and will insist on rights to the same technology afforded to all members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a senior Iranian official said in an interview yesterday.

The high-level counteroffensive, to be led by Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, comes in anticipation of a tough speech the Bush administration is preparing to give today calling for international measures against Tehran unless it gives up sensitive aspects of its nuclear program.

M. Javad Zarif, Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, said his country's efforts are peaceful and well within its rights. Kharrazi, who will address the gathering tomorrow, will spend much of this week discussing the issue with diplomats from around the world.

The White House decided several days ago to send a mid-level delegation to the United Nations, where diplomats will review ways to strengthen the nonproliferation treaty. But efforts were underway late yesterday to persuade Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to deliver the U.S. address today. U.S. officials did not rule out raising the profile of the delegation but said it would be difficult for Rice, who returned Saturday from Latin America and is scheduled to accompany President Bush to Europe tomorrow.

Conference organizers had hoped the crises with Iran and North Korea would remain in the background this week. But the hardening rhetoric and actions on all sides indicate the tensions are escalating and probably would dominate the forum.

Diplomats from more than 180 countries will spend the next month reviewing the treaty, which gives nations broad access to nuclear energy technology in exchange for pledges to forgo nuclear weapons. The deal, signed in 1970, also includes a commitment by the five original nuclear states -- the United States, France, Britain, China and Russia -- to eventually eliminate their stockpiles.

The treaty is considered one of the most successful arms-control agreements ever. But the basic bargain is often cited as its greatest flaw because countries can peacefully get a pathway to bomb-building and then leave the NPT without penalty, as North Korea did two years ago.

And although the NPT is credited with slowing the spread of nuclear weapons, it has not stopped proliferation altogether or led to the eliminations originally envisioned. Pakistan, India and Israel have not signed the pact, and there are fears that more countries could opt out. Several solutions have been offered to address the flaws, but there is no consensus on any. Delegates who have been preparing for the conference for more than a year still have not agreed on an agenda for the meeting.

As a result, the conference, which takes place every five years, is mired in turmoil and comes as tensions are gathering over Iran and North Korea. Yesterday, North Korea, which is now believed to have the means for at least six nuclear weapons, unnerved its neighbors with a missile test in the Sea of Japan. Over the weekend, Iranian officials said they could end a suspension of their once-secret nuclear energy program unless there is some progress in talks with Europe meant to resolve concerns about the country's growing nuclear capabilities.

U.S. officials, who discussed the White House's strategy, said they did not believe this conference would end with any agreements and instead braced for confrontation and criticism. Bush last week chose harsh language to describe his frustration with Tehran and Pyongyang. North Korea responded by calling Bush "a philistine whom we can never deal with."

The U.S. speech, which will be delivered to conference delegates today, focuses heavily on Iran and North Korea "in very tough language," said one U.S. official, who agreed to discuss the details on the condition of anonymity. The speech will also go over proposals Bush made in February 2004 but will not offer any new ideas about how to deal with growing nuclear crises and will avoid mention of a dozen nuclear commitments the United States signed on to, along with other nations, at the previous review conference in 2000.

Those commitments, which focus on nuclear disarmament, have become touchstones for nonnuclear states that say the United States is not honoring the treaty's main purpose of eliminating nuclear weapons.

But the Bush administration said the 2000 commitments, which did not focus on terrorism, a changed Middle East or a nuclear black market, are not relevant in a world altered by the attacks on the United States a year later on Sept. 11, 2001.

Most critics of the administration's position agree that some of the commitments are outdated and say the unilateral decision to walk away from a set of ideas adopted by consensus weakens the treaty and the U.S. position.

"If the conference fails and the U.S. is seen as the reason for that failure, it is going to be much harder for the United States to get the international cooperation it needs to deal with Iran, to deal with North Korea and to deal with all the other issues we are concerned about," said Joseph Cirincione, a nuclear expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Cirincione said U.S. research into new nuclear weapons and new uses for nuclear weapons, coupled with a refusal to ratify a treaty banning nuclear testing, has led countries to doubt the U.S. commitment to the treaty. He said the United States must lead by example if it expects others to sustain their pledges.

But the Bush administration has rejected that argument.

"This notion that the United States needs to make concessions in order to encourage other countries to do what is necessary to preserve the nuclear nonproliferation regime is at best a misguided way to think about the problems confronting us," Stephen G. Rademaker, assistant secretary of state for arms control, said in congressional testimony last week.

Rademaker, who was named to lead the U.S. delegation to the conference, said the United States would use the meeting to focus on Iran's alleged noncompliance with the treaty and North Korea's withdrawal from the agreement. European officials have been concerned about U.S. aims at the conference, saying a toughly worded speech or narrow focus on Iran could inflame rather than alleviate tensions at a sensitive time in their negotiations with Tehran. "The last thing we want is an inflammatory speech from either side," one senior European official said. Zarif said Iran plans to be firm on its rights under the treaty despite the suspicions. "An attempt to make compliance the central issue of this conference is a smoke screen designed to conceal the fact that there were decisions taken at the previous conference, and adopted by consensus, for disarmament," he said. "We know our rights."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/01/AR2005050100867.html>

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International Herald Tribune

May 2, 2005

N. Korea Is Said To Test Missile

By Brian Knowlton

WASHINGTON--North Korea apparently launched a short-range missile into the Sea of Japan on Sunday, heightening tensions on the eve of an international conference on nuclear nonproliferation.

Amid rising rhetoric on both sides, Andrew Card, the White House chief of staff, denounced the North Koreans as "bullies" and called their leader, Kim Jong Il, "not a good person."

"We're not surprised by this," Card said, apparently playing down the significance of the test. "The North Koreans have tested their missiles before."

As to their motivation, he told CNN, "I think they're looking to kind of be bullies in the world."

The reported test comes at a time of intense scrutiny of the North Korean nuclear program, and growing frustration among outside powers that Pyongyang has not returned to six-party nuclear negotiations.

News media in Tokyo reported earlier that the U.S. military had informed Japan of a possible North Korean missile firing. The reports quoted unidentified Japanese government sources as saying that the missile was believed to have traveled about 100 kilometers, or 60 miles, into the sea between the two countries.

The U.S. military in South Korea and the South Korean Defense Ministry initially refused to confirm the reports.

North Korea has intermittently tested short-range missiles off its east coast, including a launch in February 2003.

The tests of short-range missiles generally have appeared to be aimed at staving off outside pressures on Pyongyang. They have also been seen as a way to impress the North Korean people with the country's might before returning to the six-party nuclear talks.

The reported test comes at a particularly sensitive time.

Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, warned Thursday before the Senate Armed Services Committee that North Korea had the ability to mount a nuclear-tipped missile on a long-range missile able to strike U.S. territory.

His comments caught some senators by surprise, and Pentagon officials later sought to soften Jacoby's prognosis.

Card asked Sunday if Kim Jong Il could field nuclear-tipped long-range missiles, said, "We don't know that he can, but there is increasing evidence of capability." The test, if confirmed, would also precede by a day the opening of a United Nations conference on identifying and fixing flaws in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

But while President George W. Bush has urged North Korea to return to the six-party talks, rhetoric has lately escalated. The president himself referred Thursday, during a prime-time news conference, to Kim as a "tyrant." On Saturday, North Korea called Bush a "philistine" and a "hooligan."

Card in turn accused Kim Jong Il of leading a repressive government that has dangerously proliferated weapons while denying its people both democratic freedoms and basic necessities. "He is not a good person. He is not a good leader," he said.

"We're very troubled by the Kim Jong Il regime in North Korea," Card said in a separate appearance on NBC, one of three he made on Sunday programs.

North Korea shocked the region in 1998 by test-firing a Taepodong-1 long-range missile over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean. That missile would not have been capable of reaching the United States. Pyongyang since has said that it no longer felt bound by its 1999 moratorium on missile tests.

The North's missile development efforts have unsettled its neighbors.

The U.S. military in South Korea has begun deploying new Patriot missiles designed to intercept incoming missiles, while Japan has become the first country to agree to work with Washington on its missile defense project.

The Taepodong-1 has a 2,500-kilometer range, South Korean officials say. North Korea reportedly is conducting engine tests for its Taepodong-2, which would be capable of reaching the western United States.

Choe Sang-Hun of the International Herald Tribune contributed reporting for this article.

<http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/01/news/korea.php>

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New York Times

May 2, 2005

Keeping That Special Glow Safe At Home

By C. J. Chivers

MOSCOW, May 1 - The man carrying the hidden radioactive material passed among airline passengers at Sheremetyevo Airport here on an afternoon this year. His briefcase, holding the contraband, was indistinguishable from anyone else's carry-on bag.

Then, as he approached the check-in counter, lights flashed and an alarm sounded. A mounted video camera captured the man's image. Uniformed guards seized the briefcase and took it to a lead-lined booth where it could be inspected without harming other passengers.

So passed a drill of a quietly expanding nuclear security initiative in the former Soviet Union. The man, a Russian customs employee, had tripped a silent sentinel - an electronic radiation detector that had been installed by the Russian government, underwritten in part by the United States.

Since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the United States and Russia have been accelerating the installation of automated radiation detectors at Russian shipping ports, border crossings and airports, hoping to deter or detect the movement of radioactive material through Russia, a land where law and order is a deeply inconsistent affair.

Officials in the two nations hope the program, called Second Line of Defense, will complement security measures at former Soviet nuclear storage sites by providing a means to detect material that is already loose, or that in the future makes it to the wrong side of the fences.

Its principal tools are banks of sensors now visible at airports and borders in Russia, typically installed beside luggage inspection points. The program augments efforts at cooperative detection programs by the United States and former Soviet states. The United States has spent about \$35 million on the program in Russia since 1998.

Some details of the program are not publicly known, including the locations of all the sensors and the schedule for installing more, because the program managers do not want to give smugglers a map. (Russian and American officials agreed to discuss the Sheremetyevo sensors because their existence is thought to be widely known.)

But information already made public provides insight into the ambitions and limits of efforts to safeguard the public from nuclear and radioactive stockpiles left from the cold war.

Nonproliferation specialists in and out of government say that although much of the former Soviet Union's nuclear and radioactive material has been consolidated into upgraded storage sites since the union dissolved in 1991, worrisome security gaps remain. Moreover, Russia has quarreled with the United States over access to its most secret facilities.

Specialists also say that no matter the level of security and cooperation at storage sites now, uncertainty remains about the historical accuracy of Soviet nuclear inventories. That means that how much material disappeared before security was improved is anyone's guess.

The dangers have been clear since at least 1994, when a smuggler with plutonium for sale passed through this airport and flew on a passenger jet with the nuclear material to Munich, where he was arrested.

Paul M. Longworth, deputy director of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semiautonomous agency in the Department of Energy, said that given those security concerns, the sensors were part of "defense in depth," a strategy of trying to create layers of security between nuclear material on foreign soil and the United States.

"It's better to have your defense somewhere other than on the one-yard line," Mr. Longworth said in a telephone interview from Washington.

To this end, the United States has helped underwrite the installation of the sensors at about 60 Russian ports, airports or border crossings; 15 more sites are planned by Sept. 30. The program has expanded beyond Russia. Sensors were installed in Greece before the Olympics last year, and a project has begun in Lithuania. Negotiations have begun to place sensors in Kazakhstan, said Tracy Mustin, the program's director in Washington. Ukraine recently agreed to join the program.

Nikolai E. Kravchenko, chief of Russia's Service for Customs Control of Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Sources, said the sensors installed frequently picked up radioactive material, and recorded 14,000 "hits" last year.

Of those, about 200 involved cases of possible smuggling, including people who apparently had material but did not realize it. In some cases people carried money that had become irradiated, military equipment collectors carried aviation dials and other lightly radioactive souvenirs, and women wore radioactive jewelry.

Mr. Kravchenko said culpability or ignorance had been harder to determine in many cases, as when truck drivers were caught at borders with radioactive material among scrap. Almost invariably, he said, drivers claim not to know dangerous material is in their loads.

Since 1995, no weapons-grade material has been discovered, Mr. Kravchenko said. He said, however, that nuclear fuel pellets and raw uranium had been intercepted. There have also been hints of organized smuggling.

Vladislav Bozhko, who supervises the program at Sheremetyevo, said that in 2002 all the sensors at one terminal were set off in sequence, as if someone had made a dry run. "We think they were just testing how well it worked, looking for a gap in the defensive line," he said. No one was caught.

The officials say the sensors are extremely sensitive, picking up faint traces of radioactivity. (The claim withstood an unintentional check. This correspondent's wife, recently returning to Russia after undergoing medical scans in the United States, set off two sensors when entering the country. Remnants of isotopes in her bloodstream set off the alarm.)

Still, nonproliferation specialists warn that for all of their abilities, the sensors and the Second Line of Defense program have limits.

"A layered defense is really smart and important," said Laura Holgate, a regional vice president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a Washington-based nongovernmental organization that works on nonproliferation. "But the best and most efficient use of resources is to make sure the material stays put, and that it is ultimately destroyed."

"No matter how effective any other layers are," Ms. Holgate said, "none of these has any pretense of being as hermetically sealed as a site barrier."

Mr. Kravchenko said Russia hoped in time to install the sensors at every Russian border point, although it did not yet have a financing plan. For now, busy border crossings, or those near stored nuclear material, have received the sensors rather than those in remote or lightly trafficked areas.

Similar plans are being developed in the United States, where the Customs and Border Protection has been installing more stationary sensors - known as radiation portal monitors - at shipping ports and land border crossings, and intends to expand their use to cover almost all entry points to the country, said Barry Morrissey, a spokesman for the agency.

The National Nuclear Security Administration said it would continue to help Russia, but would conduct cost-benefit analyses for proposed additions to decide whether the United States should help pay. "The goal of 100 percent is something we do support, if they can get there," Mr. Longworth said. "But it does not mean that the U.S. taxpayers will pay for it."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/02/international/europe/02russia.html>

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International Herald Tribune

May 2, 2005

Erosion Of The Nonproliferation Treaty

By Jimmy Carter

ATLANTA--As the review conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty convenes in New York this month, we can only be appalled at the indifference of the United States and the other nuclear powers. This indifference is remarkable, considering the addition of Iran and North Korea as states that either possess or seek nuclear weapons programs.

In the run-up to the conference, a group of "Middle States" had a simple goal: "To exert leverage on the nuclear powers to take some minimum steps to save the nonproliferation treaty in 2005." Last year this coalition of nuclear-capable states - including Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden and eight NATO members - voted for a new agenda resolution calling for implementing NPT commitments already made. Tragically, the United States, Britain and France voted against this resolution.

Preparatory talks failed even to achieve an agenda because of the deep divisions between nuclear powers that refuse to meet their own disarmament commitments and the non-nuclear movement, whose demands include honoring these pledges and considering the Israeli arsenal.

Until recently, all American presidents since Dwight Eisenhower had striven to restrict and reduce nuclear arsenals - some more than others. As far as I know, there are no present efforts by any of the nuclear powers to accomplish these crucial goals.

The United States is the major culprit in this erosion of the NPT. While claiming to be protecting the world from proliferation threats in Iraq, Libya, Iran and North Korea, American leaders not only have abandoned existing treaty restraints but also have asserted plans to test and develop new weapons, including antiballistic missiles, the earth-penetrating "bunker buster" and perhaps some new "small" bombs. They also have abandoned past pledges and now threaten first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

Some corrective actions are obvious:

The United States needs to address remaining nuclear issues with Russia, demanding the same standards of transparency and verification of past arms control agreements and dismantling and disposal of decommissioned weapons. With massive arsenals still on hair-trigger alert status, a global holocaust is just as possible now, through mistakes or misjudgments, as it was during the depths of the cold war. We could address perhaps the world's greatest proliferation threat by fully securing Russia's stockpiles.

While all nuclear weapons states should agree to no first use, the United States, as the sole superpower, should take the lead on this issue.

NATO needs to de-emphasize the role of its nuclear weapons and consider an end to their deployment in Western Europe. Despite its eastward expansion, NATO is keeping the same stockpiles and policies as when the Iron Curtain divided the continent.

The comprehensive test ban treaty should be honored, but the United States is moving in the opposite direction. The administration's 2005 budget refers for the first time to a list of test scenarios, and other nations are waiting to take the same action.

The United States should support a fissile-materials treaty to prevent the creation and transport of highly enriched uranium and plutonium.

The United States should curtail development of the infeasible missile defense shield, which is wasting huge resources, while breaking our commitment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty without a working substitute.

Act on nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, an increasing source of instability. Iran has repeatedly hidden its intentions to enrich uranium while claiming that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only. This explanation has been given before, by India, Pakistan and North Korea, and has led to weapons programs in all three states. Iran must be called to account and held to its promises under the Nonproliferation Treaty. At the same time, we fail to acknowledge how Israel's nuclear status entices Iran, Syria, Egypt and other states to join the community of nuclear-weapon states.

If the United States and other nuclear powers are serious about stopping the erosion of the Nonproliferation Treaty, they must act now on these issues. Any other course will mean a world in which the nuclear threat increases, not diminishes.

Jimmy Carter is a former president of the United States and founder of the Carter Center in Atlanta.

<http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/01/opinion/edjimmy.php>

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Washington Post

May 2, 2005

Pg. 17

Toward A Nuclear Strategy

By John J. Hamre

America is sleepwalking through history, armed with nuclear weapons. The Cold War left us with a massive inventory of weapons we no longer need, an infrastructure we can no longer use or maintain, and no thought of where our future lies. A shrinking community of nuclear experts holds on to a massive and aging inventory as a security blanket for a future they cannot define. That same community now advocates the development of a weapon (the so-called Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, or RNEP) that commands no conviction from either the military or the broad policy community. In short, we are nowhere.

Last year Congress, led by Rep. Dave Hobson (R-Ohio), chairman of a House Appropriations subcommittee, rejected the administration's plan for RNEP. Hobson rightly asked, "What is the administration's overall plan?" and he has yet to get an answer that makes any sense. The plan he seeks is not some micro-agenda for testing components of a new design but rather a comprehensive plan for keeping America a credible nuclear power in the future. We have now gone a decade without one.

Before we decide what new things to buy, the country needs a national debate about the role of nuclear weapons and their contribution to our security. The global security environment has changed dramatically, and we need new thinking, thinking that is not mired in the battles over nuclear forces that date from the 1980s and 1990s. To stimulate that national debate, I offer these points.

First, there is an important reason the United States must have nuclear weapons: Other nations have them, and more seem to want them. We still must deter potential opponents, avoid nuclear intimidation by other powers and prevent strategic surprise by aspirant nations. America also extends its deterrence to many allies so that they do not feel compelled to build nuclear weapons of their own. Thus we must maintain a credible nuclear deterrent force, as well as theoretical and operational knowledge of nuclear weapons superior to that of anyone else.

Second, the current inventory of nuclear weapons is grossly oversized and ill-suited for whatever the future might bring. These weapons were designed for an earlier age. While the force is quite capable today and provides a reliable deterrence, its credibility will erode as it ages.

Third, we do better to hedge an uncertain future by maintaining competent design teams and building new weapons at low production rates than by holding on to a massive inventory of aging weapons.

Fourth, while many of my colleagues and associates do not share this view, I believe we should commit to retiring all our existing nuclear warheads and building a small number of new-design weapons in their place. I do not believe there is any sustainable political support for building new weapons when we continue to hold on to more than 8,000 warheads. If we start with the premise that the weapons of the past should be retired and dismantled, we can start fresh in our thinking about what kind of force we need for the future and how large it should be. I suspect that it will be a very small inventory.

Fifth, we must minimize the risk that nuclear weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists. There is no greater priority in the global war on terrorism. We can accomplish this by reducing the availability of nuclear weapons and material on a global basis. This is an urgent requirement. Consistent with it, we should start now to reconfigure the U.S. nuclear production complex to dramatically reduce its size. We should not start producing new weapons until we have a much smaller, safer production complex.

Sixth: Russia still holds on to even larger inventories of nuclear weapons than we do, in the false belief that this compensates for its current conventional weaknesses. This is counterproductive. After all, Russia has hostile terrorist

forces on its borders and has experienced terrorism directly on its own soil. The greatest danger it faces stems from its huge nuclear inventory. Both the United States and Russia must lead the world to smaller inventories. But the United States has a much better basis for making this argument if it takes the lead.

Seventh, any approach to building new warheads for a future arsenal needs to be integrated into a comprehensive program that minimizes the attractiveness of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear countries, encourages the reduction of excessive inventories among nuclear states, and strengthens the controls over nuclear stocks and material. This requires that we return to the fundamental goals that shaped adoption of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and retool them for today. Simply skimming over things in periodic review conferences -- such as the one scheduled to start today -- is another example of sleepwalking.

Finally, I do not believe we need to test the existing arsenal of weapons. The Energy Department's Stockpile Stewardship Program is adequate to that limited task, though I recognize that experts I trust argue that at some point we may need to test in order to validate the knowledge base underlying our current certification process. This problem will disappear, however, as we retire the current inventory.

Almost all technical experts believe we probably do not need to test new-design weapons to have high confidence in their effectiveness. But if we completely retire all existing systems, I think we should test the new weapons to demonstrate to the world that they are credible. Such testing need not be extensive. And while I acknowledge that testing is widely seen as a provocative act, it can be made acceptable internationally so long as it is preceded by a commitment to retire our entire existing inventory.

The actions I recommend would probably save a considerable amount of money, but that isn't why I support them. They are necessary if we are to have a reliable deterrent in the future and a diminished risk of nuclear terrorism. This is an area in which we need to scrap the past and start from scratch. The time for sleepwalking is indeed over.

The writer, a former deputy defense secretary, is president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/01/AR2005050100833.html>

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Washington Times

May 3, 2005

Pg. 1

Rice Warns North Korea Of American Might

By Bill Sammon, The Washington Times

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice yesterday issued a blunt warning to North Korea, which test-fired a missile on Sunday, that the United States can "deter whatever the North Koreans are up to."

"I don't think anyone is confused about the ability of the United States to deter -- both on behalf of itself and on behalf of its allies -- North Korean nuclear ambitions or gains on the peninsula," Miss Rice said during an appearance at the State Department with French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier. "We have, after all, a very strong alliance with South Korea and a very strong alliance with Japan.

"And, of course, the United States maintains significant -- and I want to underline significant -- deterrent capability of all kinds in the Asia-Pacific region," she added. "So I don't think there should be any doubt about our ability to deter whatever the North Koreans are up to."

The warning came as the United Nations opened a nonproliferation conference at which the Bush administration called for international pressure on North Korea and Iran to give up their nuclear ambitions.

"They need to make a strategic decision to abandon their nuclear weapons programs," White House spokesman Scott McClellan said.

"The international community is speaking very clearly to both nations and saying: 'You're only going to further isolate yourself if you take steps that run contrary to what the international community expects,'" he added. "'You will realize better relations if you pursue a course like Libya, and abandon your nuclear weapons programs.'"

Global tensions over nuclear proliferation escalated during the weekend when North Korea fired a short-range missile into the East Sea/Sea of Japan, and Iran warned that it might resume enrichment of uranium after the failure of talks with European nations.

"I would hope that the Iranians would not take a unilateral decision to initiate any activities that now are currently suspended," said Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, after meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi at the nonproliferation conference in New York.

German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer warned that a unilateral move by Iran would force the international community to refer Tehran to the U.N. Security Council for sanctions.

"I think it's important that the talks continue, but the basis must be that the enrichment program remains suspended," he said. "I hope that the process will not collapse, but the Iranians know the alternative would be the Security Council."

Mr. ElBaradei also urged North Korea to resume six-party talks with the United States, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia, which have been stalled for nearly a year.

"The earlier the parties go back to the negotiating table, the better," he said. "There is no other solution except all of the parties put all their grievances together on the table and get a ... solution that addresses Korean security and economic needs and addresses this whole nuclear program."

Despite Miss Rice's tough talk about U.S. military assets deterring North Korea, the White House emphasized the need for a peaceful solution.

"We're pursuing a diplomatic solution through the six-party talks," Mr. McClellan said. "I don't think there's a need to go through 'what ifs' at this point."

Miss Rice also met yesterday with Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura, who said both nations are urging China to help rein in Pyongyang's nuclear program.

Mr. McClellan said the U.S. thinks North Korea "may have one or two" nuclear weapons, although he would not say whether such weapons could be placed on long-range missiles capable of striking the United States.

"We don't know if they have the capability to do that or not, but that's all the more reason why we need to take steps under the assumption that they can, because of the regime that is in power there," he said.

"And that's why [President Bush] talked about the importance of moving forward on the missile defense system," Mr. McClellan added. "That's one important deterrent that we continue to pursue."

This article is based in part on wire service reports.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20050503-122313-6438r.htm>

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Washington Post

May 3, 2005

Pg. 1

U.S. Called Unprepared For Nuclear Terrorism

Experts Critical of Evacuation Plans

By John Mintz, Washington Post Staff Writer

When asked during the campaign debates to name the gravest danger facing the United States, President Bush and challenger Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.) gave the same answer: a nuclear device in the hands of terrorists.

But more than 3 1/2 years after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the U.S. government has failed to adequately prepare first responders and the public for a nuclear strike, according to emergency preparedness and nuclear experts and federal reports.

Although hundreds of thousands of lives could be saved by rapidly evacuating people downwind of a radiation cloud, officials have trained only small numbers of first responders to prepare for such an event, according to public health specialists and government documents. And the information given to the public is flawed and incomplete, many experts agree.

"The United States is, at the moment, not well prepared to manage an [emergency] evacuation of this sort in the relevant time frame," said Richard Falkenrath, former deputy homeland security adviser and now a fellow at the Brookings Institution. "The federal government currently lacks the ability to [rapidly] generate and broadcast specific, geographically tailored evacuation instructions" across the country, he said.

Security experts consider a terrorist nuclear strike highly unlikely because of the difficulty in obtaining fissionable material and constructing a bomb. But it is a conceivable scenario, especially in light of the lax security at many former Soviet nuclear facilities and the knowledge of atomic scientists in such places as Pakistan.

Two closely held government reports obtained by The Washington Post -- one by the White House's Homeland Security Council, the other by the Energy Department -- describe in chilling detail the effects of a nuclear detonation, using the scenario of a strike on Washington. They make clear the need for split-second execution by top officials of the Department of Homeland Security if downwind communities dozens of miles away are to be saved -- a level of performance that some experts say is well beyond officials' ability now.

U.S. officials say they are only in the first stages of planning ways to communicate with endangered downwind communities, via radio, television or cell phones.

Members of the public who seek information from Homeland Security's Web site, Ready.gov, may not be getting the best advice, experts said.

Take, for example, a Ready.gov graphic showing that someone a city block from a nuclear blast could save his or her life by walking around the corner. The text reads, "Consider if you can get out of the area." Nuclear specialists say that advice is unhelpful because such a blast can destroy everything within a radius of as much as three-quarters of a mile.

"Ready.gov treats a nuclear weapon in this case as if it were a big truck bomb, which it's not," said Ivan Oelrich, a physicist who studies nuclear weapons for the nonprofit Federation of American Scientists. "There's no information in Ready.gov that would help your chances" of surviving a nuclear blast or the resulting mushroom cloud, he said. Homeland Security officials acknowledge they have lots of work ahead to prepare for a nuclear strike -- a task they point out is extraordinarily difficult -- but say they have made progress.

"A lot of good work's been done, and a lot of federal resources are poised to respond," said Gil Jamieson, who helps run the department's programs to unify national, state and local emergency response efforts. "Can more work be done? Absolutely."

Department officials also say they have made strides in the monumental task of establishing standard protocols and plans among federal agencies, and with state and local authorities, on how to prepare for and respond to different types of terrorist attacks.

Homeland Security officials point with pride to the nuclear response training given to 2,200 first responders. But domestic defense experts point out there are 2 million such firefighters, police officers and emergency medical personnel nationwide.

More of them need crucial training in the dangers of radiation, how to limit their own exposure to it, how to triage victims and how to decontaminate them, they say. Many experts believe the government needs to train responders in these techniques and, more fundamentally, decide what their jobs would be in a nuclear attack.

A 2003 report by the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), designated "For Official Use Only," said the government lacks rules and standards for sending first responders into radiated areas to save people or warn them of approaching fallout. This would include standards for radiation exposure for firefighters and how to decide where to deploy responders.

The prospect of a nuclear strike "requires a fundamental shift in radiological protection policy for members of the public and emergency responders," the report added. Officials said work in these areas has barely begun.

In detailing the consequences of a 10-kiloton bomb attack on Washington, the NNSA document, and another prepared in July 2004 by the Homeland Security Council (HSC), used different wind projections and assumptions about the government's success in evacuating residents.

The HSC document, also stamped "For Official Use Only," shows a radioactive plume heading east over Prince George's and Anne Arundel counties, killing 99,000 to 190,000 people. The NNSA report describes a cloud moving northeast over Prince George's and Howard counties, and, assuming less success in evacuation, estimates 300,000 deaths.

A blast from a 10-kiloton weapon would destroy everything within a half-mile, the reports say, and cause severe damage for miles beyond. Many people would suffer "flash blindness" from the explosion.

First responders would be unlikely to enter the blast zone but would establish care centers upwind to help victims who escape, the reports say. "Triage will be a major issue," the HSC report said, noting that because of the huge numbers of victims, responders will have to turn away people too sick from radiation to survive.

In the end, years of cleanup of 3,000 to 5,000 square miles would be needed, the reports say. They also raise the possibility of forever abandoning many radiated neighborhoods. An atomic strike on this country "would forever change the American psyche, its politics and worldview," according to the White House report.

The government also has failed to communicate well with the public about nuclear dangers, terrorism experts said.

In late 2003, months after the debut of Homeland Security's Ready.gov Web site, Rand Corp. released a detailed study advising individuals on responding to various attack scenarios -- but with starkly different recommendations. Ready.gov gave almost no information on which to base a hide-or-flee decision, beyond advice such as to "Quickly assess the situation" after a nuclear blast. In general, it advised going inside, underground if possible, and fleeing by car rather than on foot.

Rand, which in the 1950s was an architect of U.S. nuclear doctrine, said going indoors "would provide little protection in a nuclear attack." It said Ready.gov's suggestion that people in the blast zone head underground after a blast is "misleading" because few people would have time to take that step.

Ready.gov made no mention of the critical factor of wind. But Rand advised that if wind is carrying smoke and the mushroom cloud toward people, they should immediately head perpendicular to it, on foot, for at least a few miles, to get out of the plume's path. Driving would be futile because of impassable roads, Rand said.

"Guidance from Ready.gov fails to indicate the time urgency involved," said Lynn E. Davis, a former undersecretary of state for arms control who was the Rand study's lead author. "We must act in a matter of minutes to survive."

Homeland Security officials said that some of the criticisms of Ready.gov are valid, and that they might change its wording in some places. But they said several experts they consulted believe miles-high winds could carry radiation in a different direction from wind on the ground.

"We decided [advice to flee crosswind] was not necessarily the best guidance for the American people," said Lara Shane, a Homeland Security spokeswoman who runs Ready.gov.

Department officials said their strategy is not for people themselves to decide what to do, but for them to listen for officials' advice over radio or television. Some emergency response experts, however, pointed out many radio and TV stations would be off the air.

"The threat information our leaders have given post-9/11 has often been disorganized, not confidence-inspiring," added Irwin Redlener, director of Columbia University's National Center for Disaster Preparedness. "It's perilous to have a system solely dependent on central leadership to save lives."

Retired Gen. Dennis Reimer, a former Army chief of staff who is now the director of the Oklahoma-based National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, said he prefers Rand's specificity. "The American people can handle that," he said. "It's like the Red Cross's lifesaving tips," he said. "Most of us aren't doctors, but we can help save lives."

Researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/02/AR2005050201454.html>

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Washington Times

May 3, 2005

Pg. 10

Images Indicate Nuke-Test Preparation

SEOUL -- U.S. spy satellites have captured the movement of heavy equipment in North Korea that could mean an underground nuclear test is being prepared, South Korea's Chosun Ilbo newspaper said yesterday.

"U.S. intelligence authorities believe the images and other information point to preparations for a possible underground nuclear test," the newspaper quoted a government source as saying.

But South Korean Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung said before a Cabinet meeting yesterday there was no unusual activity in the area.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/worldscene.htm>

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Washington Post

May 3, 2005

Pg. 18

U.S. Urges Punishment For Iran Nuclear Work

Other Nations Continue to Back Incentives

By Dafna Linzer, Washington Post Staff Writer

UNITED NATIONS, May 2 -- The Bush administration said Monday that Iran was trying to build atomic weapons in secret and suggested the international community should respond by taking away Tehran's right to nuclear energy technology.

Other world leaders attending a nuclear conference seemed to dismiss the U.S. call for punitive measures. Instead, they spoke of incentives and negotiations as a way of encouraging the Islamic republic to give up worrisome aspects of its energy program that could be diverted for weapons work.

The Bush administration went into the conference hoping to increase pressure on Iran, but its speech highlighted the differences between the United States and its allies over how best to handle emerging nuclear issues.

The crises in Iran and North Korea took center stage on the opening day of a month-long conference to review and possibly strengthen the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Written in 1970, the treaty provides countries that forgo nuclear weapons with access to sensitive technology to be used only for nuclear energy. As part of the deal, the five original weapons states -- the United States, France, Britain, Russia and China -- agreed to eventually eliminate their own stockpiles.

The treaty is credited with reducing the spread of nuclear weapons, but it has come under enormous strain in recent years with the discovery of a nuclear black market and a decision two years ago by North Korea to walk away from the agreement. India, Pakistan and Israel never signed the deal, and North Korea now says it has nuclear weapons.

The discovery of secret nuclear facilities in Iran two years ago fueled suspicions it was using its nuclear energy program as a cover for weapons work. So far, international inspectors have found no proof of a bomb program in Iran, which denies it intends to build nuclear weapons. But the top U.S. representative to the conference rejected both the findings of the inspectors and Iran's position.

"For almost two decades, Iran has conducted a clandestine nuclear weapons program," said Assistant Secretary of State Stephen G. Rademaker. He said Iran had failed to live up to its obligations under the treaty and that "no state in violation" of its main articles should receive its benefits.

Iran, which sent a high-level delegation to the conference led by Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, was planning a tough response Tuesday. Kharrazi met privately Monday with German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and with Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is leading the inquiry in Iran.

The Islamic republic has been engaged in two years of negotiations with Germany, France and Britain over the future of its nuclear energy program. The negotiations are guided by an agreement that Europe would offer Iran incentives in exchange for guarantees that the nuclear program is peaceful. But after a difficult round of talks last weekend, Iranian officials threatened to resume some nuclear work unless the European nations demonstrate progress in the negotiations.

Kharrazi would not say which way the Iranians would go. "That depends on the decision of our leaders," he said. ElBaradei urged Iran not to make any unilateral decisions, but he acknowledged that the process between Iran and the Europeans is at "a delicate phase. There's no question about it."

Fischer said it has been "a difficult negotiation, but the challenge is an important one." He said he hopes the Iranians will avoid any resumption of nuclear work while the negotiations are continuing. "We want to reach a success." Fischer did not accuse Iran of secretly working toward nuclear weapons and said the negotiations are aimed at achieving a permanent cessation of the more sensitive aspects of its program.

Rademaker called for complete dismantlement of those components in a speech that focused heavily on Iran, mentioning the country 10 times. North Korea was mentioned half as often.

"The assertion that Iran is making nuclear weapons hasn't been backed up by direct evidence," said Daryl G. Kimball, director of the Arms Control Association in Washington. "And the conference isn't going to endorse the plan Rademaker laid out when Iran and the Europeans are engaged in discussions about the program."

Over the next four weeks delegates will discuss suggestions to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and technology. There is little agreement on most issues, including the conference agenda.

U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan suggested the delegates "create incentives for states to voluntarily forgo the development" of nuclear energy programs that rely on sensitive technologies. And he called on the United States and Russia to move quickly toward reducing the thousands of nuclear weapons in their own stockpiles.

"The use of security assurances would also help to reduce security concerns," ElBaradei told the conference as a reminder that countries such as Iran are more likely to keep their nuclear options open if they feel threatened.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/02/AR2005050201594.html>

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New York Times

U.S. Demand Deepens Gulf With Iran Over Nuclear Facilities

By [DAVID E. SANGER](#)

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UNITED NATIONS, May 2 - The gulf between Iran and the United States deepened Monday when the Bush administration, at the opening of a conference on the future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, demanded that Iran dismantle all the "equipment and facilities" it has built over the past two decades to manufacture nuclear material.

The demand, made by Stephen G. Rademaker, an assistant secretary of state who spoke at the opening of the conference in the chamber of the General Assembly on Monday afternoon, is a longtime demand but it comes at a sensitive moment. Just two days earlier Iran threatened to resume some production activities. As part of its negotiations with the European Union over the future of its nuclear program - which it insists is solely intended for electricity production - Iran has demanded that it be allowed to install 3,000 centrifuges, which enrich uranium. If enriched at a low level, that uranium could fuel a nuclear power plant. But the centrifuges could also produce enough highly enriched uranium to manufacture nuclear weapons.

Mr. Rademaker's statement on Monday was intended to focus the conference on loopholes in the 35-year-old treaty, which he charged that Iran and North Korea have exploited. "Today, the treaty is facing the most serious challenge in its history due to instances of noncompliance," he said. Though the International Atomic Energy Agency has said

it has yet to find concrete evidence of a weapons program in Iran, Mr. Rademaker expressed no doubts about what Iran had done.

"For almost two decades Iran has conducted a clandestine nuclear weapons program, aided by the illicit network of A. Q. Khan," Mr. Rademaker said, referring to the head of Pakistan's nuclear research laboratory, who was at the center of a huge black-market network in nuclear technology. Mr. Rademaker offered the administration's first public confirmation that Mr. Khan had also traded in nuclear weapons designs - a reference to a Chinese design for a nuclear weapon that the Khan network provided Libya, though he stopped short of saying that Iran had also been given that design. "We assume that what the Libyans got the Iranians also got," a senior American intelligence official said recently. "But can we prove it? Not yet."

The Bush administration has long demanded that North Korea dismantle all of its nuclear facilities, and in Washington Mr. Bush's aides have argued that President Clinton erred in 1994 by signing an accord with the North that did not require the country to dismantle its facilities and ship all of its nuclear material out of the country. The North has refused to do so, and pulled out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 2003. It now asserts that it has reprocessed its stockpile of spent nuclear fuel into nuclear weapons.

At the conference here, there is considerable concern that Iran will follow the same model. Its chief nuclear negotiator said on Friday that in the next week Iran's leaders will decide whether to resume the production of a form of uranium that can be poured into centrifuges for enrichment. Both American officials and officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency said they were concerned that as Iran's June elections draw nearer, a politically popular drive to restart the nuclear program may accelerate.

Mr. Rademaker described the American demands by saying that any solution "must include permanent cessation of Iran's enrichment and reprocessing efforts, as well as dismantlement of equipment facilities related to such activity." The dispute over what Iran should and should not be allowed to do encapsulates the challenges facing the review of the treaty, which takes place every five years.

The 184 signers of the treaty who do not have nuclear weapons, or who have given them up, insist that the central bargain of the 1970 accord allows any signer to build nuclear facilities as long as they are for peaceful purposes. The treaty gives the International Atomic Energy Agency the responsibility to inspect those facilities to make sure that they are not being turned to weapons production.

They also contend that the United States is not living up to its commitment that all nuclear weapons nations will move toward the elimination of their arsenals. Mr. Rademaker insisted Monday that progress was being made, noting that the Moscow Treaty signed three years ago with Russia requires huge reductions in deployed nuclear warheads by 2012. But he did not mention the treaty provision that critics note permits the United States to keep thousands of additional warheads in nonoperational storage. The treaty also leaves unclear what will happen after 2012, though Mr. Rademaker noted in an interview on Friday that "it is no one's intention to rebuild the arsenal." With the weapons and nonweapons countries so divided, Kofi Annan, the United Nations secretary general, and Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, tried to find middle ground today. Mr. Annan said that the former cold war rivals must commit "to further cuts in their arsenals, so that warheads number in the hundreds, not the thousands." Dr. ElBaradei sought to calm the fears of nonnuclear states that they would be cut off from nuclear technology as a result of the growing effort to keep it out of the hands of nations like Iran and North Korea.

Dr. ElBaradei argued that his agency needed broader rights to inspect any facilities it desired, and to enforce stricter control over the most sensitive technology. But he also renewed his call for guarantees that any country that needed reactor technology or nuclear material for power generation would be guaranteed a supply, saying that "is clearly a prerequisite" for acceptance of international controls on the technology.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/03/international/middleeast/03npt.html?>

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Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports.

GAO-05-375, March 31.

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Highlights - <http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d05375high.pdf>

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